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1. Introduction  
 
Human communication often expresses more than what is explicitly said. 
To convey and retrieve additional information beyond what is literally 
encoded, speakers and hearers exploit certain inferential principles, often 
called implicatures. This paper is concerned with one well-known such 
case of pragmatic inference, namely scalar implicatures (SIs) with the 
quantifier some. Take (1) as an illustration. Though the literal meaning of 
the sentence in (1a) is equivalent to (1b), (1a) communicates (1c):  
 
(1) a. John ate some of the cookies. 
b. John ate one or more cookies. (= possibly all) 
c. It is not the case that John ate all of the cookies.  
 
Under the traditional Gricean (1975) account, the hearer arrives at (1c), an 
SI, using the following line of reasoning. Assuming the speaker of (1a) is 
co-operative, she would have uttered a more informative sentence with all 
if John had indeed eaten all of the cookies. Since the speaker chose not to 
do so, the hearer infers that she is not in a position to offer the stronger 
statement, most likely because the stronger statement does not hold. Such 
reasoning about alternative sentences that could have been said instead 
leads to SIs as in (1c).  
 
Computing implicatures is a multi-step process, which we can generalize 
to an algorithm as in (2) (e.g., Sauerland 2004, Katzir 2007):  
 
(2) Step 1: Compute the literal meaning of a sentence S 
John ate some of the cookies. (= one or more, possibly all) 
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Step 2: Generate a set of alternatives, ALT(S), by substituting 
some with appropriate lexical items of the same category, or 
scalemates 
{John ate all of the cookies, John ate most of the cookies…} 
 
Step 3: Negate those sentences in ALT(S) that are logically 
stronger than S 
{¬John ate all of the cookies, ¬John ate most of the cookies…} 
 
Step 4: Strengthen the basic meaning of S by conjoining it with 
the negated alternatives in Step 3 
{John ate some of the cookies and it is not the case that John ate all of 
the cookies…}  
 
Upon hearing a sentence with a scalar term like some, the listener first 
calculates the basic or literal meaning of the expression. Next, she must 
generate a set of sentences that may have been uttered instead, by 
replacing some with its scalemates. Those alternatives in the set, which are 
more informative than the original sentence S are then negated, resulting 
in the “strengthened” meaning of the utterance (e.g., some, but not all).   
 
 
2. Developmental work 
 
In order to become competent communicators, children need to be able to 
make use of an algorithm as in (2). A number of studies on children’s 
scalar implicatures, however, suggest that children under age 6 have 
considerable difficulties in this realm (Noveck 2001, Papafragou & 
Musolino 2003, Huang & Snedeker 2009, Barner et al. 2011). Preschool-
aged children often accept “weak” readings with some when a stronger 
statement with all would have been felicitous. For example, in a study by 
Papafragou and Musolino (2003), children were shown a scenario with 
three horses, all of which jumped over a fence. A puppet then described 
the scene using the sentence “Some of the horses jumped over the fence.” 
When asked whether the puppet’s statement was a good description of 
the situation, adults said “No,” but children responded affirmatively. This 
pattern of behavior has been taken to mean that children do not enrich the 
meaning of some in the prompted sentence to some, but not all.   
 
Children’s performance improves drastically under certain experimental 
manipulations. They are adult-like when given training, or when the task 
involves direct comparison of alternatives. In a series of studies by 
Chierchia et al. (2001) and Gualmini  et al. (2001), children who, in the 
classic Truth Value Judgment paradigm, appeared insensitive to the 
exclusivity implicature triggered by the disjunctive operator or (i.e. “p or q, 
but not p and q”) showed adult-like accuracy in a task that asked them to 
compare under-informative/weak sentences and informative sentences. 
Two puppets offered statements that differed in strength, and children 
were asked to reward the puppet who “said it better”. Children 
overwhelmingly rewarded the puppet who uttered the informationally 
stronger sentence, revealing their capacity to assess alternatives when they 
are explicitly provided. More recently, it has been showed that simply 
priming the stronger alternative, e.g., an all statement, in the experiment 
context improved performance (Foppolo et al. 2012, Skordos and 
Papafragou 2014). When the critical some-trials are preceded by all-trials, 
children can draw on this contrast to derive a strengthened some, but not 
all meaning.   
 
The above findings tell us that though children do not always calculate 
implicatures, the general cognitive machinery necessary for pragmatic 
enrichment is in place. So, what is behind their underperformance to 
begin with? To put differently, which steps of the algorithm in (2) do 
children find difficult? An answer is put forth in Barner, Brooks and Bale 
(2011), who argue that the difficulty lies in Step 2 of the algorithm: 
children cannot spontaneously generate the alternatives, likely because 
they have trouble retrieving the relevant lexical items with which to 
replace the relevant scalar term. On the other hand, if the alternatives are 
given to them, they successfully compute the strengthened meaning.  
 
Support for this hypothesis comes from findings that children continue to 
have trouble even when strengthening is required by the grammar, e.g. 
when you have an overt exhaustifier like only. In their experiment, the 
authors showed that children accept statements like “Only some of the 
animals are sleeping” in contexts where all of the animals were sleeping. 
On the other hand, when the relevant animals were individuated, as in 
“Only the cat and the dog are sleeping,” they performed at ceiling. The 
authors argue that in the latter case, the relevant scalemates (e.g., the cat, 
the dog) are readily available to them because it is explicitly listed in the 
prompt.  
 
Barner, Brooks and Bale (2011) predict, then, that children should perform 
like adults even in SI-tasks when the burden of spontaneous alternative-
generation is removed, that is, when the stronger alternative is available in 
the context. The high performance in, e.g., Chierchia et al’s (2001) felicity 
judgment task and Foppolo et al.’s (2012) alternative-priming task is 
consistent with their hypothesis: in both cases, the relevant alternative 
sentence is readily accessible in the context.  
 
The present study further explores the role of accessible alternatives in 
children’s performance with scalar implicatures with some. Specifically, 
we were interested in whether children benefited from having the 
stronger alternative salient in the experimental context, but crucially, not 
provided as a linguistic object. We contrasted some, but not all and all by 
visually representing the two sets side by side. The child was then asked 
to choose the set that best represented a some-sentence. Findings from the 
word-learning literature show that even at very young ages, children are 
able to consider contrastive alternatives even when they are not verbally-
encoded (Carey 1978, Markman 1989). We reasoned that the visual 
contrast between all and some should point children in the right direction 
as to which alternative to generate and negate. Contrary to our 
expectations, children did not reliably discriminate between the some, but 
not all and all sets until after 6 years of age.  
 
 
3. Experiment 
 
We asked whether making the some-all contrast salient by depicting all 
alongside some, but not all (henceforth some) would improve children’s rate 
of SIs. Children were given a four-choice picture selection task, where the 
choices were sets in which some, all, none, or some part of the objects 
satisfied a given predicate. The prompt always involved some. The 
alternative with all, though never explicitly given, is easily construable 
from the context. If children benefit from the contextual availability of the 
stronger alternative, we should find them performing like adults, 
strengthening the prompted sentence and choosing the some set. 
 
3.1. Methods 
 
Our data are part of a large, longitudinal study on cognitive, linguistic 
and socio-emotional development (Landry 2010). The study was 
conducted over the course of 4 years, with each participant being tested 4 
times. Thus, we were able to track the time-course of SI-development on 
the same group of children.  
 
3.1.1. Participants 
 
353 children from subsidized schools in Texas and Florida participated in 
our study. Testing time 2 took place 8 months after Time 1, Time 3 took 
place a year after Time 2, and Time 4, a year after Time 3. Children began 
the study when they were 4-years-old (Mean Age at Time 1 = 4.53) and 
completed it when they were approximately 7-years-old (Mean Age at 
Time 4 = 7.06).  
 
3.1.2. Design and Materials 
 
There were two items with the quantifier some, given in (3). The small 
number of critical items was due to time-constraints imposed by the large 
battery of tests being run with each child.  
 
(3) Scalar Implicature items 
 
a. Some cars are red. 
b. Some birds are blue.  
 
Children were given a four-choice picture-selection task, as exemplified in 
Figure 1 below1. The array included pictures where some, all, none, or parts 
of the cars were red.  
 
Figure 1: Picture array in task 
 
 
Participants were asked to point to the picture where “Some cars are red,” 
and instructed to select only one of the 4 sets. We expected that adults in 
the task would draw the SI and strengthen “Some cars are red” to “Some 
but not all cars are red,” resulting in a selection of the top-right set in 
Figure 1. Selecting the some (but not all) picture was therefore considered a 	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  These materials were inspired by early work by Roeper and Matthei (1975).  
“correct” response in this task. Any other selection was coded as an 
“incorrect” response.  
 
3.2. Results  
 
3.2.1. SI-computation over Time  
 
We found that at the earlier stages, children do not consistently choose the 
target set, but performance increases steadily over Time. The some-set is 
not the predominant choice until Time 3, when the participants are 
around 6 years old. The rate of accuracy at each time is given in Table 1:  
 
Table 1: Accuracy by Time 
Time Mean Age Accuracy SD 
1 4.53 .27 .44 
2 5.06 .36 .48 
3 6.07 .55 .50 
4 7.06 .80 .40 
 
A maximally-specified mixed-effects model confirmed this trend: Time 
was a significant predictor of performance on SIs. Our model was 
specified such that the accuracy at one time was compared to the accuracy 
at the next time: Time 1 is thus compared to Time 2, Time 2 to Time 3, and 
Time 3 to Time 4. We find that performance did not change significantly 
between Times 1 and 2 (β = 0.29, Odds Ratio = 1.33, p = 0.1). However, 
children are significantly more likely to correctly choose the some-set at 
Time 3 than they were at Time 2 (β = 1.61, Odds Ratio = 5.02, p < .001), and 
much more likely to choose some at Time 4 than at Time 3 (β = 4.11, Odds 
Ratio = 61.16, p < .001).  
 
A closer look at the children’s responses reveals that even at the earliest 
stage, they know the logical meaning of some: the none and part responses 
are rarely selected, as illustrated in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Children’s Response Types 
Time all none part some 
1 54% 7% 12% 27% 
2 48% 6% 11% 36% 
3 30% 4% 11% 55% 
4 12% 2% 6% 80% 
 
In spite of their semantic knowledge of the quantifier, children do not 
consistently strengthen the some-sentence to some, but not all. The all-set is 
frequently chosen as the best representation of the prompted sentence, 
especially by the younger children, who show a preference for the all set. 
So, in spite of salient contrast between the some and all, children do not 
appear to be calculating an implicatures at the earlier stages.  
 
The behavior of participants in this study is thus reminiscent of children’s 
behavior in the early Truth-Value Judgment Tasks (e.g., Noveck 2001). 
Our data provide further corroborating, longitudinal evidence in support 
of these earlier findings that adult-like, automatic calculation of 
implicatures is an ability that develops over time: the same child is more 
likely to compute an implicature at age 7 than she was at age 4.  
 
3.2.1. Linguistic & cognitive predictors of SIs  
 
Scalar implicatures are phenomena that sit at the intersection of language 
and cognition. On the one hand, implicatures are triggered by specific 
lexical items. On the other, they involve a complex reasoning process that 
takes into account an array of linguistic and extra-linguistic information. 
Thus, the inferential process involved in pragmatic enrichment likely calls 
upon linguistic capacities as well as domain-general cognitive machinery. 
It is of interest, then, to see whether children’s abilities with other aspects 
of language and cognition have an impact on their performance with 
scalar implicatures. Since our SI-task was part of a larger study on 
linguistic and cognitive development, we were able to investigate 
precisely this question.     
 
At Times 1 and 2, measures were also taken of children’s Executive 
Functioning ability (“Knock Tap Test”, Korkman, Kirk & Kemp 1998), 
Vocabulary (Expressive One Word Picture-Vocabulary test), and syntax (Wh-
questions subtest on the DELV Language Assessment, Seymour, Roeper & 
de Villiers 2005). We conducted analyses on a subset of the data consisting 
of these two testing times to see whether these measures predicted 
accuracy on the scalar-implicature task. In other words, are children who 
are better at inhibitory control or different aspects of language also more 
likely to compute implicatures with some?  
 
We specified logistic mixed-effects models with participant and item as 
random effects and Time, Executive Functioning, Vocabulary and Wh-
questions (with the corresponding interaction terms) as fixed effects. The 
model revealed no main effect for any of the factors, but it did show a 
significant Time*Executive Function interaction (β = 1.36, p=.05) and a 
Time*Wh-Question interaction (β = .35, p=.05). At Time 1, there appears to 
be little relationship between Executive Functioning or Wh-Questions on 
accuracy with scalar implicatures—performance is near-constant 
irrespective of ability on either of these measures. However, at Time 2, a 
clear trend emerges where children who have higher scores on Executive 
Functioning and Wh-questions are also better performers on scalar 
implicatures.  
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the development of scalar implicatures does not 
seem to be an isolated phenomenon, but rather, one that interfaces with 
the development of other aspects of cognition such as syntax and 
executive functioning. The particular patterns of these relationships are 
also informative:  the lack of effect at Time 1 of either Executive 
Functioning or Wh-questions might be indicative of a stage in 
development where children simply do not have the resources to make SI-
related calculations, irrespective of their abilities in other domains. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
The present study set out to test whether children can draw implicatures 
of the form ‘some !  ¬all’ when an implicit contrast between some and all is 
made in the context. We provided longitudinal data on a large sample, 
replicating findings that i) 4-year-olds know the logical meaning of some, 
but ii) children younger than 6 are happy to accept a some and possibly all 
reading in contexts that implicate some, but not all for adults. Although the 
trials depicted both all and some (but not all) sets, at the earlier stages, the 
all-set was chosen as representing a some-sentence at least as often as the 
target some-set. Our findings suggest that the availability of the all-
alternative in the context did not sufficiently encourage children to 
compute a not-all implicature. 
 
Previous studies have shown that children strengthen some-statements 
when the contrast with all is explicit, e.g., when they had to directly 
compare sentences with some and all or when the critical some-trial was 
preceded by an all-trial (Chierchia et al. 2001, Foppolo et al. 2012, Skordos 
and Papafragou 2014). Why are they unable to make use of the implicit 
contrast between some and all in the present study? One reason might be 
that identifying the intended contrast might itself be more challenging in 
our task. Compare our picture-selection task with the felicity judgment 
task as in Chierchia et al. (2001), where two sentences where evaluated 
relative to a single picture. The task itself makes unambiguous that there 
is a lexical contrast between the two scalar elements compared. Our task, 
on the other hand, involves a single sentence and two semantically 
compatible situations or sets. Given that the task calls for the “best possible 
choice,” adults infer that a contrast is intended between the two sets that 
make the sentence literally true. However, children might not take a 
similar step in reasoning, and may even be assuming different criteria 
(e.g., a greater number of items satisfying the predicate) for choosing the 
best answer.  
 
Secondly, unlike tasks that involved linguistically-encoded alternatives, 
our task could not guarantee that upon seeing the array, the child (or 
adult) encoded the relevant set using an all-proposition. Upon initial 
encounter, one could just as well describe the critical sets in Figure 1 as, 
for example, “Three cars are red” and “Five cars are red.” If this is the 
case, the contrasts depicted cannot be expected to aid the retrieval of an 
alternative sentence with all.  
 
The present study and much of the previous work demonstrate that in 
spite of having the cognitive machinery for pragmatic strengthening from 
early on, adult-like computation of scalar implicatures is an ability that 
continues to develop well into the early primary-school years. Adults 
compute implicatures with some by default, canceling the inference only 
when the situation demands it. Children, on the other hand, seem to 
compute scalar implicatures only when unambiguously required by the 
context. Since the communicative contexts are bound to vary with 
different experimental materials and methodology, we also expect varying 
performance from children. The complex, at times conflicting, set of 
findings in the developmental literature is illustrative of precisely this.  
 
Why isn’t computing implicatures a default step for children, as it appears 
to be for adults? Prior studies have shown that computing scalar 
implicatures comes at a processing cost (e.g., Bott and Noveck 2004, 
Breheny, Katsos and Williams 2006). It might be that children, who 
arguably have fewer cognitive resources available to them, may prefer not 
to incur these costs unless absolutely necessary. This would also be 
consistent with our finding that there is a positive link between executive 
functioning and the ability to compute implicatures. However, the precise 
nature of the differences between adult and child implicature generation 
remains an important, open question.  
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